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ABSTRACT
The Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH ) (Malone & Yates & Benjamin 1987) holds that electronic
markets will eventually evolve towards unbiased markets under the pressure of both competitive and
legal forces and that this process is inevitable in case of markets for commodities. We criticise the
EMH for its definitional impreciseness, its disregard for strategic and technological counter forces and
the absence of market characteristics as contingent factors in the prediction. These critiques drive our
research interest in the nature and effectiveness of the competitive and legal forces that are held to be
crucial in the evolution towards unbiased markets, in particular in the light of the regulatory authorities
that are often installed to institutionalize these forces. In this paper we present our ongoing research
that intends to nuance the, in our opinion, overly optimistic and naïve view of the EMH by examining
the Dutch electricity industry as an example of a commodity market that has recently been liberalised.
Specifically, we examine the nature and effectiveness of the regulatory transparency increasing
measures of the DTe (Office of Energy Regulation) from the perspective of the DTe and the
comparison websites that these measures are aimed at. Preliminary results indicate that even in
markets for commodities, competitive measures have to be complemented with a proactive
‘information authority’ to enforce the ‘inevitable’ evolution towards unbiased, transparent electronic
markets.
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1. Introduction
Malone, Yates and Benjamin’s (1987) classic exposé on the emergence and evolution of electronic
markets discerns a gradual three-staged progress of electronic markets (biased-unbiased-personalized).
Based on coordination theory (Malone 1987), they argue an overall shift towards proportionately more
market-based coordination. This prediction, come to known as the electronic markets hypothesis
(EMH), has proven to be extremely valuable as a guiding principle in (economic) research concerning
electronic markets, e-business and (dis)intermediation (see Urbaczewski & Jessup & Wheeler (2002)
for an overview). Nevertheless, the EMH is far from sanctifying: it is slightly optimistic, if not naïve,
little nuanced and conclusive empirical evidence for it fails to be discovered. Fortunately, various
researchers have added to the explanatory/predictive strength of the EMH both by additional
theoretical differentiation and empirical research in various industries (e.g. Bakos 1998, Granados &
Gupta & Kauffman 2005c). We aim to further the current understanding of the evolution of electronic
markets by focusing on the presumed forces that drive the transition from biased markets to unbiased
markets, in particular the forces that relate to the required informational transparency of unbiased
markets.

The EMH holds that in the transition from biased to unbiased markets: “producers who start out by
providing an electronic hierarchy or a biased electronic market will eventually be driven by
competitive or legal forces to remove or significantly reduce the bias” (Malone et al. 1987, p.492).
Even though these forces are often clearly exemplified, their nature is yet to be fully understood,
specifically when it comes to the forces that affect and tend to increase the informational transparency
of electronic markets. In addition, their implementation and subsequent effects are not unequivocal. In
general, it is believed that if competition is stimulated, increased transparency will follow by itself. A
more profound understanding of these forces will not only increase our theoretical understanding of
the EMH, it is also a prerequisite for regulatory authorities to effectively design and implement
measures to enhance the transparency of electronic markets in their objective to establish unbiased, or
‘frictionless’ markets in an industry. We conjecture that transparent, unbiased markets require an
proactive ‘information authority’ that regulates and ensures an industry’s transparency. Our research
question is twofold: (1) what is the nature of the competitive and legal forces that are aimed at
increasing a market’s transparency? (2) To what extent are regulatory authorities effective in
instituting such transparency-increasing measures? This study addresses these questions by means of
an exploratory case study in the Dutch electricity industry. The decontrolling of the electricity industry
started in 1998 (installation of the Electricity law) under the auspices of regulatory authority DTe
(Office of Energy Regulation) and various measures were, and are still being, installed to increase the
level of competition and transparency. Some of these measures have been aimed at the electricity
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comparison websites. We analyse the nature of and rationale behind the transparency increasing
measures, and their effects from the perspective of the DTe and the comparison websites that currently
exist.

In this paper we first provide three critiques of the EMH that have triggered our research questions.
We then present our approach to the empirical study in the Dutch electricity industry. We conclude by
discussing some preliminary results of the research.
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2. A critique of the Electronic Market Hypothesis
Given the tremendous impact and follow-up of the EMH, criticizing it resembles committing
sacrilege. As a precaution, we therefore re-emphasize our intention to further develop and nuance the
daring hypothesis on the evolution of electronic markets. Nevertheless, we criticize the EMH for 1) its
general lack of definitional preciseness, 2) its disregard for technological and strategic inhibitors in
specifying the transitional forces from biased to unbiased markets, and 3) the absence of specific
market characteristics as contingent factors in the predicted evolution to unbiased markets.
In the two core contributions (1987, 1989) that have put the EMH on the map, the staged evolution of
electronic markets has been predicted with mediocre preciseness in its definitions. To begin with, the
evolutionary market stages are ill defined in the sense that characteristics of the three stages are not
discussed but merely given a general feel for by providing several examples (typically the airline and
medical supplies industries). As a result, it remains unclear to what extent informational transparency
is in fact a necessary condition for the existence of unbiased markets, and which other conditions also
apply. In general, the extent to which Malone et al. appeal to economic theory on the ‘perfect’, or
economically efficient, market is uncertain. The partial overlap in theoretical conditions of unbiased
markets and economically efficient markets seems obvious: the perfect information assumption1
should apply in order for transparent, informationally efficient, unbiased markets to exist. However,
Malone et al. do not refer explicitly to efficient market theory, nor do they link its theoretical
assumptions to their characterization of the three market stages. We suggest these links should to be
clarified in order to raise the theoretical status of the EMH and to ease the empirical identification of
different market stages in practice. Furthermore, a similar critique of impreciseness applies for the
transitional forces that Malone et al. describe. The staged evolution of electronic markets does not
occur autonomously: transitional forces, such as competitive and legal forces (1987, p.492) will drive
the change from biased to unbiased markets. The nature of the competitive forces is partly explained:
buyers will benefit so significantly from the electronic brokerage effect that they will drive suppliers
to remove their bias. While this force relies heavily on the market power of buyers, it nevertheless
reveals part of the nature of the competitive forces; something, which cannot be said of the legal forces
that are believed to be of importance. Again, these legal forces are merely exemplified (with a classic
American Airlines example), not theoretically underpinned. As a result, their role in the predicted
evolution remains largely implicit, and needs additional clarification.

1

The perfect information assumption holds when all economic actors instantly have complete and perfect
information about all relevant aspects of market transactions and production, exchange and distribution
activities, including market opportunities, available technology, cost of production under alternative productive
arrangements, the quality of the goods produced and, critically, the intentions of their fellow actors; and any new
information is instantly disseminated to all market parties at no cost (Truijens and Huizing 2005, p.7).
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Our second critique relates to the transitional forces. We believe that Malone et al. overemphasize the
positive forces that lead to unbiased markets. They disregard (or underestimate) at least two counter
forces that hamper removing the biases from electronic markets: technological inhibitors and vested
strategic interests of market parties around information asymmetries. First, while IT is undeniably
becoming increasingly pervasive in most industries, some industries are lagging in the dissemination
of information systems over all market parties, particularly industries with large numbers of smaller
suppliers, where profit margins are thin and IT investments are prohibitive for some individual market
parties (as for example in the Dutch travel industry (Truijens 2004, p.264). Alternatively, the existing
IT infrastructure itself might have a lagging effect on the evolution to unbiased markets (as for
instance in the airline industry). Legacy systems might be unsuited for real-time concurrent access that
comparison websites require and costly (third-party) solutions (e.g. Orbitz) need to be developed first
(Granados & Gupta & Kauffman 2006, p.12). Second, the strategic imperatives of information
asymmetries play an important role as a counter force in the evolution towards unbiased markets (Zhu
2002). As long as opaque market mechanisms exist (e.g. bidding) and information advantages are a
source of economic rents in opaque markets (Truijens 2004), suppliers will have a strong incentive to
deter unbiased markets. Their options range from actively boycotting unbiased market initiatives by
not taking part in them or not providing information that is crucial for such initiatives to become a
success (e.g. net prices, in-stock information), to initiating their own biased market initiatives placing
themselves in a position to manipulate or confuse the outcomes of comparisons or to ask user fees
(Bakos 1991, p.302). In addition, theoretical explanations (e.g. Clemons’ (2003) ‘move to the middle’
hypothesis) seek to explain the economic rationale behind suppliers’ efforts to hamper the removal of
biases from electronic markets (see (Granados & Gupta & Kauffman 2005b, p.4-5) for an overview).
We advocate that the EMH needs to take these strategic and technological counter forces into account
in order to nuance its overly optimistic hypothesis on the evolution of electronic markets.

Our third critique concerns the implied generality that the EMH contains: the predicted evolution to
unbiased markets should apply uniformly to all electronic markets. Malone et al. only partly cover
themselves by stating that markets evolve in different tempi. However, empirical research in the
mortgage industry (Hess and Kemerer 1994) shows that some markets for differentiated products do
not evolve as anticipated, leading to the conclusion that “either the results predicted by the EMH
require a longer gestation period or that the underlying hypothesis will require augmentation” (p.252).
We strongly believe the latter is the case, since even over decade of patience has not led to
significantly different outcomes in this industry. More specifically, we agree with the opinion (Bakos
1991, Granados & Gupta & Kauffman 2005a) that certain market properties such as its type
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(commodity of differentiated product) and (micro)structure2 (Spulber 1999) are important contingency
variables for the EMH. In markets for differentiated products, suppliers have a range of options to
prevent markets from becoming transparent, for instance by engaging in extensive product
differentiation, or by employing price discrimination or bundling to inhibit product and price
comparisons. Similarly, in markets with limited information disclosure by suppliers, a difficult price
discovery by buyers and complex trading protocols, suppliers have the opportunity to deter the
evolution towards unbiased transparent markets. Therefore, we emphasize that if we recognize
markets to differ significantly in terms of their type and their microstructures, we should also
recognize that these differences not only impact a market’s transaction costs, but also on its probability
to evolve towards unbiased and transparent markets. In our opinion Malone et al. have overlooked this
subtlety in their hypothesis and more research is required to understand the exact influence of these
two contingency variables.

Inspired by the above research opportunities, our research focuses on the nature of the competitive and
legal forces that are held responsible for the evolution towards unbiased markets in commodity
markets. It is stated that under the pressure of these forces in commodity markets, electronic markets
will inevitably destabilize profitable monopolistic outcomes, thereby reducing seller profits and
increasing buyer welfare (Bakos 1991). In order to institute these forces in practice, regulatory
authorities can be appointed that design and implement a set of measures to increase a market’s level
of competition and transparency. In general, it is believed that increased competition will lead to a
higher level of informational transparency in a market, while Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001) show
the opposite can also be the case in their study of the Danish concrete industry. Competitionenhancing measures (e.g. privatisation, liberalization of market access) have been extensively
discussed and evaluated in the Industrial Organization Economics literature and tested in policies in
practice. However, the nature and rationale of regulatory measures aimed directly at enhancing a
market’s transparency are less clear. How can such measures effectively deal with the counter forces
that deter unbiased markets? Should regulatory authorities employ these transparency measures, or
will ‘invisible’ market forces autonomously drive the market towards unbiased? Our aim in this
research is to clarify the nature and effectiveness of regulatory transparency-increasing measures in
commodity markets by means of an exploratory case study in the Dutch electricity industry.

2

Market microstructure is defined as the set of market participants, institutions and mechanisms that enable
trade. It emphasizes that firms make explicit decisions to select trading prices and coordinate transactions that
support exchange (Granados et al. 2005a, p.5).
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3. Research approach and status
Our choice for a qualitative approach to this study is led by the nature of the research questions posed
and the observed weaknesses in theoretical grounding in the EMH. We find the case study research
strategy appropriate for studying transparency regulation in the electricity industry for we attempt to
illuminate a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result
(Schramm 1971) and the main research question is a ‘how’ question (Yin 1994). Furthermore, case
studies can be effectively employed for building theory (Eisenhardt 1989) that explains the nature and
effect of the competitive and legal forces in the evolution towards unbiased markets, including the
possible counter forces.
The rationale behind selecting the Dutch electricity sector as the focal industry in this research is
twofold. The first and foremost reason for this industry is that electricity is often mentioned as an
exemplar of a commodity product for it satisfies the key characteristics of being an undifferentiated
product with uniform quality, produced in large quantities by many different producers resulting in an
equivalent product. In the EMH, the evolution towards unbiased markets is held to be inevitable in
markets for commodity products. Therefore, should Malone’s et al. prediction in fact be correct, it
would be noticeable in prima facie in markets for commodities. Since the start of the deregulation in
1998 and the enforcement of free choice of electricity supplier for consumers in July 2004, several
web-based initiatives that compare the products and prices of Dutch electricity suppliers have indeed
emerged. Their appearance and intention to increase the market’s transparency for consumers
indicates that the market indeed has had biases. Now, after over a year of gestation period, we believe
it is reasonable to expect that the transparency-increasing influence of these comparison websites
should have a noticeable effect of removing at least some biases from the market. If not, we have
reason to doubt and thus enhance the core logic underlying the predicted evolution towards unbiased
market.
The second reason is that the Dutch electricity industry provides a unique opportunity for investigating
all parties involved, because we can benefit from the ease of surveyability of the industry. An
investigation commanded by the DTe (2004) revealed that the 13 URL’s of comparison websites
relied on just 5 data and calculation engines. Meanwhile, a take-over purchase by one of the engines
(gaslicht.com) and a discontinuation of another (energievergelijken.nl) have reduced the number of
comparison engines down to 3. This allows us to be complete in our case selection on the side of the
comparison engines and to include gaslicht.com, energieplaza.nl and energieprijzen.nl.

The design of the case study can be characterized in spirit of Yin (1994) and Stake (2000) as a
collective, exploratory, idiographic, multiple holistic case study consisting of 4 cases. The primary
data source in the study is interviews held with managing directors/project managers at the case sites.
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By now, the managing directors of all three comparison engines have committed themselves to
cooperating fully in the research and in-depth interviews with two of them have already been
conducted. In addition, we have been able to collect background information from the initiator of the
discontinued comparison engine in order to enlighten the main reason behind his decision to quit. On
the side of the regulatory authority DTe, the initial contact has been made with the project manager
that is responsible for the quality assessments of electricity comparison websites, however interviews
at the DTe have yet to be conducted. In the near future, we hope to extend the scope of the research to
include the three largest energy suppliers, as possible additional counter forces in the evolution
towards unbiased markets.

The focus and topics of the semi-structured interviews is derived from the EMH framework depicted
below in figure 1. After the EMH is shortly introduced to the interviewee they are asked to reflect on
and exemplify the stages that the EMH discerns as well as the reality of the evolution towards
unbiased markets and the driving forces from their individual perspective. The interview then focuses
on the regulatory measures that are currently implemented and their effect within the interplay of
forces.
Electricity
comparison
websites
Electronic markets
pe

rsp

ec

tiv
eo

scope of research

n

Biased markets
Competitive
forces

?

influe

nc e

?

influ

Legal forces

e nc e

Unbiased markets

pe
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ctiv
e

on

Personalized markets
DTe

Figure 1.

Scope of research and focus of interviews

Interviews are recorded, transcribed and send to the interviewee for review and corrections before the
data analysis phase. Any available documentation, research reports, news articles, company
information from brochures and websites are collected to complement the interview data. All data will
then be coded using Atlas.ti as a tool for qualitative data analysis in order to facilitate cross-case
analysis in the final research report.
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4. Preliminary results
The preliminary results in this study indicate that the market for electricity is in fact biased and the
competitive and legal forces that should aid the removal of these biases are existent, respectively in the
form of electricity comparison websites and the regulatory authority DTe. However, their expected
influence in prospering the evolution towards unbiased markets is questionable, while, given the
EMH, it should be unmistakeable given the fact that electricity is a commodity.

The comparison websites that currently exist are unable to make the market fully transparent and thus
unbiased. Partly, this is caused by the complexity of the tariff structure of energy products (i.e.
numerous levy’s, surcharges and taxes for fixed and variable parts of the tariff), partly because some
suppliers, typically the three largest suppliers Nuon, Eneco and Essent, are hesitant to disclose their
tariff information and/or pass on changes instantly to the comparison websites. Also, some energy
suppliers make special offers for products that are only valid if bought via a particular comparison
website, thus influencing (read: biasing) the outcome of the comparison in their favour. A possible
explanation for these biases still to exist is that the earnings model of comparison websites is based
completely on energy suppliers, either by a monthly fee or a fee per switch-over, and additional
earnings from ads on the website. The supplier-based source of these earnings could make it difficult
for comparison websites to pressure suppliers to remove their biases, and to disclose their correct tariff
information on time, even when claiming that their ultimate objective is to provide a correct overview
and comparison of all tariffs.

Whether the DTe is in fact in a position to remove these biases has yet to be investigated in more
depth. However at first sight, the DTe seems to be limited in its ability to legally enforce increased
market transparency and to remove existing market biases. Currently, the focus of their attention and
regulatory measures are aimed at improving the quality of existing comparison websites. After an
initial inspection of the quality of their information and calculations and the completeness and
independency of comparisons, the DTe now intends to repeat these inspections up to 4 times a year.
They, however, lack the legal measures to impose fines or enforce the compliance of comparison
websites in case of any inadequacies. At the moment, the DTe has no intention to initiate their own,
truly independent, comparison website, nor are they willing to sponsor or promote the comparison
website that is considered the best in their inspection. Not surprisingly, the comparison websites are
benevolent towards the DTe, for their inspection provides free advice on where and how to improve
their comparisons. Nevertheless, they feel that the DTe is barking up the wrong tree and should
address the transparency-inhibiting practices of electricity suppliers (specifically the three largest
suppliers) as well as address the complexity of the tariff structure.
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Overall, it seems that to rely only on competitive forces to increase market transparency and to create
an unbiased market in this industry is mainly a test of faith and patience. Strategic inhibitors to
unbiased markets are a counter force, which can not be assumed to simply vanish in the evolution of
electronic markets. The assumptions that IT networks will benefit buyers for instance through
increased product customisation, increased outsourcing, reduced supplier dependency, multiple linked
markets, expanded customer bases, and low-price guarantees in fact seem to be myths of the effective
market (Grover and Ramanlal 1999). Particularly, when the legal forces are not in place, or
insufficiently equipped to enforce truly fair competition and fully open information disclosure. Even
when it concerns commodity markets, the EMH seems to be overly optimistic about the power of
competitive forces and the effectiveness of regulatory transparency increasing measures. In our
opinion, the EMH’s prediction that unbiased markets will occur can only be proven to hold for
markets with commodity products if a proactive ‘information authority’ functions in addition to the
normal regulatory measures (e.g. anti-trust, anti-monopoly). If not, market parties that have no interest
in increased market transparency will easily find ways to de-commoditize the market, for instance
through extensive product differentiation or price discrimination. We advocate to include these and
other nuances in the EMH in order to raise its explanatory power.

Finally, we stress again that we do not intend to prove that the EMH is fundamentally flawed. On the
contrary we praise Malone’s prediction for it provocative nature, given the time that it was made in.
We hope that the nuances that this research aims to add to the EMH will enhance our thinking about
the economic effects that we can realistically expect to occur in the evolution of electronic markets.
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